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ABSTRACT 
 
Samantha Wakil Al Ghoul: Objectivity and Orgasm 
(Under the direction of John Roberts)  
 
Lloyd (2005) analyzes every proposed evolutionary explanation of female orgasm and argues that 
all but one suﬀer from serious evidential errors. Lloyd attributes these errors to two main biases: 
androcentrism and adaptationism. But, there is an alternative explanation for the discrepancies in the 
case of the female orgasm that Lloyd’s analysis overlooks. I present and argue for the plausibility of this 
alternative explanation. In short, the alternative explanation is that an imprecise definition of orgasm is 
what’s partially responsible for the missteps in this research domain. Further, Lloyd takes her analysis to 
support Lonigno’s (1990) Contextual Empiricist model. Insofar as Lloyd’s analysis fails to capture an 
important part of scientiﬁc practice the alternative explanation picks out, this might reveal a shortcoming 
for Contextual Empiricism.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Science is often given a special—privileged—status over other forms of inquiry. Presumably, 
it is the success of scientiﬁc methods which justiﬁes the intellectual authority of the scientiﬁc 
community and supports the claim that science can accurately describe, discover, and underwrite 
knowledge about the natural world. Many claim it is the objective character of scientiﬁc reasoning 
that is responsible for its incomparable epistemic success. (Popper 1959, 1972; Jeﬀery 1956, Levi 
1960; Carnap 1967; Betz 2013) To characterize the methods and results of science as objective is to 
express the idea that it is free of any individual or community wide values, biases, or personal 
interests. But, the fact scientiﬁc research is a human activity threatens to undermine this idea and any 
associated concept of objectivity. Criticisms of scientiﬁc practice show that contextual values and 
bias can, and often do, negatively impact both the theoretical and experimental aspects of research. 
(Kuhn 1962; Rudner 1953; Douglas 2009; Longino 1990) 
In an eﬀort to save scientiﬁc objectivity Longino (1990) defends a view that embraces 
contextual values within scientiﬁc practice. Aptly called Contextual Empiricism the view is based on 
a social epistemology; it assumes knowledge (especially scientiﬁc) is a social process and product. 
Science can be considered objective to the degree the scientiﬁc community engages in 
transformative criticism which requires ‘intersubjective interactions’ amongst scientists. These 
interactions are what facilitates the transformation of the subjective into the objective, enabling the 
scientiﬁc community to form a consensus on what qualiﬁes and is incorporated into the body of 
scientiﬁc knowledge. Importantly, Contextual Empiricism rejects any independent standards by 
which to assess scientiﬁc theories, methods, and results. This radically departs from other standard 
 2 
accounts which attempt to specify cognitive values that explain the epistemic success of science and 
serve as norms to guide scientiﬁc assessments. Values such as simplicity, breadth of scope, 
consistency, empirical adequacy, and explanatory power are well known candidates. But, Longino 
(1996) argues that in certain research contexts these traditional “cognitive” values can be politically 
regressive and lead to empirically inadequate science.1 Thus, even the values we might characterize as 
cognitive are in fact contextually dependent. 
Blurring the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive values bolsters the Contextual 
Empiricist model and supports Longino’s claim that only a social and pluralist account can maintain 
the objectivity of science. To augment the failings of the traditional values Longino proposes 
mutuality, novelty, applicability to human needs, diﬀusion of power, and ontological diversity as new 
values that ought to be contextually adopted. However, both the traditional and Contextual 
Empiricist set of values fail to identify a core and common error aﬄicting scientiﬁc practice. As 
such, even when combined the aforementioned values are insuﬃcient as a normative guidelines and 
explaining the unparalleled success of science. 
The error is using an imprecise deﬁnition of the target phenomenon being studied. 
Analyzing a case study about female orgasm research illustrates the error clearly, thereby exposing 
the deﬁciency in both sets of values. Lloyd (2005) claims androcentric and adaptationist biases have 
mislead evolutionary explanations for the origin of female orgasm. Out of the 21 explanations 
oﬀered Lloyd claims only one is empirically adequate. Importantly, Lloyd endorses the Contextual 
Empiricist model. Lloyd not only uses the model as a diagnostic tool but argues that adhering to 
                                                 
1 Consider the inﬂuence social ideologies of gender had on gametic fusion research. Gendered 
characterizations of an “active” sperm on a “mission to assault” the “passive” and “awaiting” egg mislead 
scientists about the contribution the egg plays in the fertilization process. (Martin 1991) According to 
Longino this example shows how it can be a theoretical virtue to consider causal processes as mutual rather 
than having a single causal factor; which Longino considers a traditional though non-Kuhnian value. 
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Contextual Empiricism would have helped researchers avoid producing and accepting faulty science. 
I argue however that the contention surrounding the case of the female orgasm is due to an 
imprecise deﬁnition of the trait in question. Further, I propose that the absence of an exact 
deﬁnition is what enabled the biases Lloyd identities to seep into this research domain. Section 2 
summarizes Lloyd’s critique of research on the female orgasm. Section 3 explains the shortcomings 
of Lloyd’s critique. Section 4 teases apart the various ways orgasm might be deﬁned and takes this 
variance as the basis for a new analysis of what went wrong in the case of the female orgasm. 
Section 5 concludes by examining the implications of this new analysis for the concept of scientiﬁc 
objectivity. 
 
II. FEMALE ORGASM 
  Lloyd argues that ardent adaptationism is the most destructive bias in evolutionary accounts 
of the female orgasm. Adaptationist explanations assume the presence of the female orgasm trait is 
due to its being naturally selected for. The most common type of adaptationist explanations are 
‘pairbonding’ accounts; 11 out of the 21 proposed evolutionary explanations take this form. The 
hypothesis is that orgasm helps ensure a monogamous relationship with a sexual partner. Monogamy 
could, theoretically, provide many reproductive advantages. Consequently, these explanations claim 
orgasm helps create pair-bonds which in turn motivates individuals to have intercourse with the 
same person.  
The empirical discrepancy with pair-bonding accounts is the signiﬁcant gap between the 
occurrence of intercourse and the occurrence of orgasm.2 An average of 32 studies examining the 
frequency between intercourse and orgasm indicates only 25.3 percent of women reliably orgasm 
                                                 
2 Of course, a present gap between orgasm and intercourse does not establish that there was a gap in the 
evolutionary past when the adaptation supposedly evolved. 
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with intercourse. (see chapter 2 in Lloyd 2005). In fact, orgasm is much more common during self-
masturbation and homosexual sex acts (Garcia et al. 2014) making its adaptive value for 
reproductive sex dubious. 
In response to the negative frequency between intercourse and orgasm several sperm 
competition explanations have been proposed. Most notably is the ‘up-suck’ hypothesis which 
claims that orgasm creates a sucking mechanism within the uterus that helps propel sperm into the 
reproductive tract, which supposedly increases the chance of fertilization. There are several 
problems with the up-suck hypothesis. First, there is no evidence that orgasm increases the 
probability of conceiving and there is no association between orgasm and number of oﬀspring. 
(Zietsch and Santtila 2013) Second, the evidence that there is a sucking-like mechanism is at best 
equivocal. Some studies have even recorded a reduction in uterine pressure after orgasm. (see 
chapter 7 in Lloyd 2005) Finally, while fertility is necessary for reproductive success, reproductive 
success depends on more than merely the ability to get pregnant.3 Trade-oﬀs between the number 
and quality of oﬀspring, and between adult reproductive eﬀort and mortality, are constantly 
occurring. Additionally, the costs and beneﬁts of such trade-oﬀs are not ﬁxed and vary signiﬁcantly 
in response to changing environmental factors. The sperm competition explanations on oﬀer fail to 
even consider these ecological and evolutionary complexities. 
i. Androcentrism  
The other bias Lloyd argues has misled scientists is androcentrism. Lloyd deﬁnes 
androcentrism as viewing things from an exclusively male perspective. There are two variants of 
androcentrism speciﬁcally regarding female orgasm. First, that female sexuality is analogous to male 
                                                 
3 While I agree with Lloyd on this conceptual point, the former (reproductive success) necessarily depends on 
the later. Therefore, the focus on fertility doesn’t appear to be a totally baseless starting point for sperm-
competition accounts. 
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sexuality. This means assuming males and females have the same physiological and psychological 
sexual responses. Second, that female sexuality is reproductive sexuality. In other words, that 
procreative—i.e. heterosexual vaginal intercourse—is the only evolutionarily signiﬁcant type of sex. 
Lloyd argues both of these assumptions should be rejected. (see chapter 8) Unsurprisingly, these 
assumptions often appear together. For example, one hypothesis suggested that the function of 
female orgasm is to communicate sexual satisfaction to a male. The male’s ability to identify female 
orgasm derives from female orgasm resembling male orgasm, and the communication of sexual 
satisfaction is supposedly adaptive because it could protect the female from retaliation of her male 
partner who suspected inﬁdelity: “men had to be sure that their females were going to be faithful to 
them when they left them alone to go hunting.” (Morris 1967, p 64) 
This account ﬂies in the face of the available evidence. Compared to females who do not 
show any or much sexual excitement, females who show more excitement or can orgasm easier tend 
to have a statistically signiﬁcant greater number of sexual partners. (Wolfe, 1979) Additionally, 
several studies report large success in women faking orgasms (see Hamilton, 1929 and Thornhill et 
al. 1995) calling into question male’s ability to recognize when a woman has orgasmed. Finally, cross 
cultural studies indicate that most men are not concerned with female sexual satisfaction at all. 
(Davenport, 1977) 
ii. The By-product Account 
This account claims females have the potential to orgasm because of the strong selection on 
males to orgasm and their shared embryologic origins. Orgasm is necessary for male reproductive 
success, as the contractile pulses serve as the sperm-delivery system. Thus, there is strong selective 
pressure for the materials needed in male orgasm development. The tissues and muscle ﬁbers 
associated with orgasm develop in the embryo before the respective sex organs gain their distinctive 
features. During the ﬁrst eight weeks of development male and female embryos have no 
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diﬀerentiating characteristics except for the chromosomes. If the embryo is male, after eight weeks 
of gestation there is a release of hormones that triggers the development of the male sexual 
apparatuses and female sexual organs develop otherwise.4 
One piece of evidence supporting this account is that the penis and clitoris appear to be 
homologous organs. There is a shared organ between male and female embryos that only develops 
into the respective sex organs after the dose of hormones it receives at the eight week gestation 
period. The clitoris and penis have the same erectile tissue, nerve tissue, and muscle ﬁbers which are 
involved in sensing sexual excitement and producing orgasmic contractions. Lloyd also claims the 
by-product account ﬁts with data regarding masturbation techniques amongst women (which almost 
never includes penetration) and the infrequency of orgasm with heterosexual intercourse. As 
mentioned before, this same data seems to be inconsistent with evolutionary explanations that 
assume female orgasm is related to the potentially reproductive aspect of heterosexual intercourse. 
Furthermore, it follows from adaptive accounts that males should be incentivized to either 
choose females who can easily orgasm or prioritize making their mate orgasm. But cross-cultural 
evidence suggests that in typical communities “men take the initiative and, without extended 
foreplay, proceed vigorously towards climax without much regard for achieving synchrony with the 
women’s orgasm...coitus is primarily completed in terms of the man’s passions and pleasures, with 
scant attention paid to women’s response. If women do experience orgasm, they do so passively.” 
(Davenport 1997, p149; quoted in Lloyd 2005 p115) Finally, of the few nonhuman primate species 
that appear to have orgasm the orgasms most frequently occur during self-masturbatory or 
                                                 
4 The male nipple is an analogous by-product example. There is a strong selection pressure for female nipples 
in mammals due to its reproductive necessity to feed oﬀspring. Male mammals acquire nipples from the same 
early embryological form with females. (See Symons 1979) 
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homosexual sex acts. Thus, there is no evidence which suggests orgasm has a reproductive role in 
female primates. (See chapter 5 for a complete presentation of the by-product account) 
According to Lloyd, the upshot is that the byproduct account does not share the background 
assumptions which seem to have implicated the other accounts with serious evidential problems. It 
does not assume the female orgasm is an adaptation, leading scientists to generate procreative 
hypotheses. Nor does it assume androcentrism, motivating hypotheses based on the false idea that 
female sexual response is analogous to male sexual response. Out of all 21 evolutionary explanations 
for the female orgasm Lloyd claims the byproduct account is the most empirically supported. Lloyd 
concludes that “there is a direct tie between making these background assumptions and making the 
speciﬁc evidential errors that I have detailed [ ] when it comes to explanations of female orgasm.” 
(2005 p256) Despite the depth of Lloyd’s analysis it misses an additional (perhaps more 
fundamental) error in the case of the female orgasm. As the next section will argue, the by-product 
account Lloyd defends is guilty of the androcentric bias she claims is partially responsible for the 
evidential errors of the competing theories. 
 
III. TWO DEFINITIONS OF HOMOLOGY  
The by-product account of female orgasm is based on the concept of homology. The 
standard notion of homology in evolutionary biology refers to the divergent development of 
structures or processes from a common origin. It’s clear Lloyd has this developmental deﬁnition in 
mind. In support of the by-product account she says “The penis and clitoris have the same 
embryological origins and are thus called ‘homologous’ organs.” (Lloyd 2005, p108) But, there is a 
diﬀerent way of deﬁning homology. Crucially, this alternative deﬁnition is the one operative in 
Symons (1967) by-product explanation which Lloyd claims to explicate and defend.  
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An interesting historical analysis reveals Symon used a non-developmental concept of 
homology based on a congruence between genetic sex and behavioral sex; according to which there 
are distinct male and female sexual behavior patterns. (Lee 2013) For example, “mounting” is 
supposedly a male behavior. Behaviors that match the genetic sex of the individual displaying the 
behavior are “homologous” while behaviors that match the opposite genetic sex are “heterologous”.  
These two deﬁnitions of homology lend themselves to radically diﬀerent interpretations of 
the potential for females to orgasm. On the developmental reading it refers merely to the shared 
prenatal tissues that develop into either a penis or clitoris, supplying females with the physiological 
materials required to potentially orgasm. But on Symon’s idiosyncratic deﬁnition it refers to the 
potential for an individual to have both male and female behavior patterns. According to Symon the 
adaptiveness of orgasm in males makes it a speciﬁcally male sex response. Thus, when men orgasm 
“it is homologous because the behavior matches the genotypic sex, in females it is heterologous, 
because it does not match....her mating response to a male is female behavior [but] her orgasm is a 
male behavior. Her behavior is male and female at the same time.” (Lee 2013 p1025)  
Symon’s deﬁnition of homology—by claiming orgasm is a distinctly male trait and using 
male orgasm as the proxy for characterizing female orgasm— is dripping with the androcentrism 
Lloyd deﬁnes as “not treating female sexuality as autonomous from male sexuality or male 
reproduction” (2005 p236) and “assuming females response is like males response” (2005 p237). 
Importantly, the evidence Lloyd cites in favor of the by-product account does not distinguish 
between the two diﬀerent interpretations; both are equally supported by the available evidence. In 
other words, if we hold ﬁxed what is common between the two interpretations, intervening on the 
androcentric bias won’t have any eﬀect on the core hypothesis that females have the potential to 
orgasm in virtue of selection for male orgasm. Thus, it seems the biases Lloyd identities cannot fully 
account for the missteps in this research area. 
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So, what can we say about the case of the female orgasm? Early in the book when explaining 
the basics of female orgasm Lloyd makes a passing claim which, I think, contains a potential answer: 
“...orgasm is a signiﬁcant and crudely quantiﬁable aspect of sexual response that has caught the 
attention of evolutionists.”(Lloyd 2005, p23) It is the “crudely quantiﬁable” bit that I think has 
understated importance. My hypothesis is that the lack of a precise deﬁnition of ‘orgasm’ has been 
(and still is) the primary obstacle for this domain. It’s important to clarify before moving on that 
when I refer to the deﬁnition of orgasm I am not making any claims about what the ordinary 
everyday notion of orgasm is, means, or refers to. The concern here is with the way statements 
about the explanandum are characterized. The starting place for any evolutionary inquiry requires 
getting as clear as possible on what exactly it is we are trying to explain; and for the sake of 
generating testable hypothesis and critical predictions this must involve specifying measurable 
features of the trait in question.(Sober 1999) The ordinary concept of orgasm is too elusive to meet 
this criteria, yet it has been featured in many prominent scientiﬁc accounts of female orgasm. The 
next section will illustrate the diﬀerent ways orgasm may be deﬁned and argue that more precise 
characterizations of the trait are what account for improved empirical adequacy of current orgasm 
research. 
IV. WHAT EXACTLY IS AN ORGASM? 
Canvassing the relevant literature immediately reveals the obvious lack of an explicit 
deﬁnition.5 What exists is a mishmash of physiological, behavioral, and phenomenological 
descriptors: “the mounting of tension and peak of sexual response.” (Bancroft 1989 p81), “Climax 
of intense feeling followed by feeling of relief and relaxation.” (Wallin 1960) “Reﬂexive clonic 
                                                 
5 There are two potential problems here. First is the plurality of deﬁnitions and second the imprecision of the 
various deﬁnitions. I am only identifying the latter as the problem in this case study. Though I have strong 
pluralist predilections, I make no claims here about the former. 
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contractions of pelvic/abdominal muscle groups.” (Mould 1980), “Stretchreﬂex release of 
genitopelvic muscular vasocongestion” (Sherfy 1972), and my personal favorite “a capacity to 
surrender to ﬂow of biological energy” (Reich 1973). Despite the wide disparity, the various 
deﬁnitions of female orgasm can be taxonomized under two broad categories: classiﬁcatory and 
quantitative.6 
Classiﬁcatory deﬁnitions merely identify orgasm as particular point during sexual activity. 
The most widely used model of the sexual response cycle is Masters and Johnsons four stage model 
(1966). The four stages are: excitement, plateau, orgasm, resolution. Orgasm is a classiﬁcatory 
concept on this model, used to identify a speciﬁc stage in the cycle. They do state orgasm involves 
muscular contractions, and through observational reports they claim the muscular contractions can 
be in the vagina, uterus, rectum, or a total body contraction, and is followed by a “release”. Prause 
(2012) highlights the limitations of what I’m calling a classiﬁcatory deﬁnition of orgasm. Most 
studies she notes “commonly describe orgasm as a ‘peak sensation of intense pleasure’ without 
citation [ ] which should be attributed to a lack of evidence to cite.” (Prause 2012, p7) Further, the 
limited data collected from studies which use a classiﬁcatory deﬁnition (including Master and 
Johnson) rely on self-reports, but “self-reports are of unusually limited utility in the study of female 
orgasm...many women are unsure whether they even experience orgasms...it also appears diﬃcult or 
impossible for women to identify sites of orgasm stimulation reliably (see also Levin, 2012).” (Prause 
2012 p8) Thus, Prause rightly concludes “studies should include other measures of orgasm in 
addition to self-report whenever possible...studying physiological responses warrants inclusion of 
                                                 
6 I’m borrowing this terminology from Carnap’s classiﬁcation scheme for the explication of empirical 
concepts. Explication is a tool for transforming or replacing imprecise concepts with new more exact 
concepts. There are three categories: classiﬁcatory, comparative, and quantitative. Quantitative is the most 
precise, classiﬁcatory the least. (Carnap 1950) 
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physiological measures whenever possible. A number of methods are available (Bohlen and Held, 
1979; Levin, 2004; van Netten et al., 2008). It is surprising these have not been used.” (2012 p8) 
The imprecise classiﬁcatory notion can easily be contrasted with a quantitative concept of 
orgasm. By using an insertable device that combines photoplethysmograph (blood-ﬂow sensor) and 
electromyograph (muscle activity sensor) technology researchers can directly measure the pressure, 
pattern, and duration of pelvic and genital contractions during sexual activity. Additionally, the levels 
of various hormones can, and in some cases have been, recorded to characterize orgasm. Although 
there are the tools available to quantitatively characterize orgasm, as Prasue notes these tools “will 
not be acceptable to many volunteers and will bias participation.” (2012 p8) Despite these practical 
diﬃculties some research, which will be discussed later in this section, has shifted to more precise 
deﬁnitions of orgasm. With the distinction between a classiﬁcatory and quantitative deﬁnition of 
orgasm now delineated a diﬀerent explanation of the case study presents itself. Interestingly, there 
seems to be a strong correlation amongst the theories Lloyd critiques: the most empirically 
inadequate theories (which according to Lloyd are guilty of the most evidential errors) use a 
classiﬁcatory deﬁnition while the most empirically supported appeal to a more precise—partially 
quantiﬁed—deﬁnition.7 Further, I claim that a close examination of some of the studies Lloyd 
criticizes suggests that the use of the imprecise concepts is what enabled the biases Lloyd identiﬁes 
to inﬁltrate this research area. We will examine one such case next. 
i. The explication explanation  
                                                 
7 See page table 2 on page 104. All of the studies that have 6 or more of the problems Lloyd identiﬁes either 
do not deﬁne orgasm at all or merely appeal to the Masters and Johnson classiﬁcatory notion. Ironically one 
of these studies, Beach (1976), explicitly acknowledges a problem with the deﬁnition “rapidly increasing 
precision and sophistication in endocrinological and neuroendocrinological techniques have not been 
accompanied by comparable advances in the deﬁnition and measurement of behavioral variables.” (p105 
italics my emphasis) 
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Consider the assumption that female sexual response is analogous to males’ sexual response. 
Several accounts have been developed on the basis of this assumption (see Lloyd chapter 5). For 
example, that the adaptive function of female orgasm is to convey sexual satisfaction to males in 
order to protect females against violent retaliation in cases of suspected inﬁdelity. Another example 
comes from Gallup and Suarez (1983). They claim that orgasm keeps a woman lying down after a 
man ejaculates and this increases the probability of conceiving. The intuitive (but false) idea was that 
the ability for sperm to reach the cervix would be threatened by gravity if a woman were positioned 
upright after a man ejaculates (Morris 1967). In support of their hypothesis they note “the average 
individual requires about ﬁve minutes of response before returning to a normal state after orgasm.” 
(Gallup and Suarez p195). Lloyd correctly criticizes Gallup and Suarez’s evidential basis. In support 
of their claim about post orgasm resting period they cite Kinsey et al (1948); a study which only 
contained trials only on males’ post orgasm response. This makes it clear Gallup and Suarez are 
guilty of assuming female orgasm response is the same as males’. In fact, women are typically in a 
higher state of arousal and restlessness directly after orgasm. Women are also more likely to orgasm 
when ‘on top’, regardless of when or if her partner orgasms. (see Lloyd chapter 3) Importantly, this 
contradictory evidence was available several years prior to Gallup and Suarez’s 1983 paper. 
For a theory about the evolution of the female orgasm, the total disregard for any female 
data might be taken as the perfect example of androcentric bias subverting scientiﬁc practice. But, 
androcentrism does not account for another error Gallup and Suarez make: they never actually 
deﬁne orgasm. The most they say is that “at orgasm there are muscular contractions...” (ibid. p195) 
and do not characterize these contractions (quantitatively or otherwise) any further beyond stating 
that they occur. While an explicit deﬁnition of orgasm from Gallup and Suarez is lacking, there are a 
clues which suggest they had the classiﬁcatory concept in mind. Their entire theory is centered on an 
observed ‘sedative eﬀect’ following orgasm in males. Their reference for this phenomena is Masters 
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and Johnson’s work on the sexual cycle. Recall, on this model orgasm is a classiﬁcatory concept and 
the sedative eﬀect described falls under the resolution phase of the model.  
Lloyd is correct that Gallup and Suarez’s use of male speciﬁc data is a major ﬂaw in their 
study. Further, androcentrism very well may explain why Gallup and Suarez (and others) assume the 
male and female sexual responses are analogous in the ﬁrst place. But I think it is 
mischaracterization of trait itself that actually accounts for the failure of their evolutionary 
explanation and, relatedly, that it is the vague deﬁnition that undergirds the problematic 
assumption.8 
Whether we should accept this depends on what evidence there is for the following 
counterfactual: had scientists used a more precise deﬁnition of orgasm they would not have (or at 
least been less likely) to make the androcentric assumption that male and female sexual responses are 
analogous. Without an experiment to test this prediction no direct evidence is available. But, there 
are several reasons that make the hypothesis quite plausible. First, consider the response to the 
following objection: It is, at best, underdetermined whether a more precise concept would have kept 
Gallup and Suarez from making the evidence errors they did. Had they not assumed female and 
male sexual response was analogous they would not have used data collected only from males and 
this would have been suﬃcient for rejecting their evolutionary hypothesis. It seems likely that a 
study merely asking females to report their energy levels post orgasm would have been enough to 
demonstrate females are not in a sedative-like state. This objection misses the mark in two respects: 
(1) had Gallup and Suarez kept a vague deﬁnition of orgasm but dropped the androcentric 
assumption they might have been able avoid the evidential errors they made. But, while they 
potentially could have avoided the speciﬁc errors Lloyd charged them with, they would not be 
                                                 
8 In fact, Lloyd at one point states that“...faulty descriptions of the trait being explained maybe be a suﬃcient 
reason to reject an evolutionary account.”(Lloyd 2005, p59) 
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safeguarded from other errors related to the methodological concerns mentioned before regarding 
the unreliability of self-reports and merely behavioral observations; and (2) the objection simply 
does not to justice to the fact that studies which have made some increase in precision are 
responsible for establishing that male and female sexual responses are analogous is an indefensible 
assumption (see Stoleru et al. 2012 and Wise et al. 2017) Relatedly, facts about brain activity can be 
separated from Gallup and Suarez speciﬁc claim that orgasm keeps a female lying down after 
orgasm. Females may be observed to remain laying down after orgasm, even with increased brain 
activity. 
Second, imprecise concepts are rarely components of substantive wellconﬁrmed 
generalizations: ‘germ’, ‘life’, ‘substance’,‘essence’, ‘aura’, and ‘life-force’ for example. On the other 
hand, enhancing precision typically facilitates increasing experimental testability, measurability in the 
ﬁeld, theoretical uniﬁcation, mathematical rigor, etc. (Justus 2012). Finally, and complementary to 
this last point, there is a new theory about the origin of female orgasm which begins by emphasizing 
how vague deﬁnitions the trait have confounded researchers. Importantly, their theory (which while 
tentative seems to have strong evidential support) uses a very precise deﬁnition of orgasm. Looking 
at the details of this explanation makes clear the epistemic gains that come from increases in 
precision. 
ii. Orgasm induces ovulation 
Pavlicev and Wagner (2016) propose a new explanation about the evolution of the female 
orgasm. They make a targeted criticism against the current explanations on oﬀer (including the by-
product account). That is the competing explanations all appeal to evidence from current human 
biology and this evidence is relevant to the modiﬁcation of the trait, not its evolutionary origin. 
Tracing the evolutionary history of the trait requires identifying its homologue in other species. 
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But, they note a problem with the way orgasm is usually deﬁned “Human orgasm is often 
described as a climax, followed by a sudden discharge of sexual arousal. Deﬁned this way, the 
presence of female orgasm is hard to establish with certainty beyond primates, and hence little has 
been found about its distribution.” (2016 p 327) Instead, they propose to describe orgasm 
speciﬁcally by a neuroendocrine discharge, in particular a surge of prolactin. Pavliceve and Wagner 
argue that this surge may reveal the homolog of human female orgasm, as it occurs in many other 
mammals is a measurable trait across species. They reason that the “surge serves a range of 
important but variable reproductive functions across mammals, [and] may have become modiﬁed to 
what we understand as female orgasm in humans, as its ancestral reproductive function became less 
important or obsolete” (2016 p327). More speciﬁcally, they hypothesize that the ancestral 
reproductive role preceding human female orgasm was that orgasm would induce ovulation. This is 
in fact what the phylogenetic evidence and comparative anatomy suggests. Not only is spontaneous 
ovulation derived within placental mammals post the evolution of copulation and environmentally 
induced ovulation, but the evolution of spontaneous ovulation is correlated with an increasing 
distance of the clitoris from the vaginal canal across mammal species. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned before, Lloyd takes her analysis of the case of the female orgasm to support 
the Contextual Empiricism model. In light of the new analysis presented here it’s worth considering 
what implications (if any) it has for Contextual Empiricism and the notion of objectivity in general. 
Longino critiques other models of objectivity—like Kuhn 1962; Kitchcr 1993; Soloman 1995, 2001; 
Alvin Goldman 1995—for ignoring the very process that generates scientiﬁc knowledge. (Longino 
1990; 2002) Science, Longino claims, can be considered objective “to the degree that it permits 
transformative criticism.” (1990 p76). Transformative criticism is achieved by ‘intersubjective 
interactions’ and Longino speciﬁes four evaluative criteria of intersubjective interactions (1990 p76): 
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(1) Avenues of criticism: public forums to criticize evidence, methods, assumptions, and 
reasoning.  
(2) Uptake of criticism: theories and beliefs must change over time as a result of critical 
discourse.  
(3) Shared standards: publicly recognized standards used to evaluate theories, observations, 
and hypotheses.  
(4) Equality of intellectual authority: The consensus of the community must result from 
critical dialogue where all relevant perspectives are represented. 
 
The most contentious feature is the third requirement, the shared standards of evidence. What 
exactly these should constitute is unclear. Longino explains the shared standards are supposed to 
serve as ideals that regulate normative discourse, and this is where cognitive values are typically 
invoked. But, Longino denies that the traditional cognitive values typically thought to be part of the 
shared standards are always reliably truth conducive because socio-political factors can taint the 
evaluation of theories, hypotheses, and even observations. (1996) Assuming this is correct, a more 
pressing question remains. Even Longino admits that in many cases the traditional cognitive values 
are a good criteria for making scientiﬁc judgments. So, what is it about socio-political factors that 
potentially undermines the truth conduciveness of traditional cognitive values? Contextual 
empiricism does not provide much insight on this question. But, the explication explanation points 
to one potential answer. As we saw in the case of the female orgasm, failing to use a precise 
deﬁnition of the target phenomena was correlated with theories having serious evidential 
discrepancies and the biases Lloyd identiﬁes. Therefore, it might be that using classiﬁcatory or 
 17 
comparative concepts is what enables social-political factors to enter into scientiﬁc discourse; 
allowing them to contaminate the usual success of traditional cognitive values.9 
 To put the upshot another way, Contextual Empiricism is motivated by Longino’s view that 
any inquiry “must characterize its subject matter at the outset in ways that make certain kinds of 
explanation appropriate and other inappropriate. This characterization occurs in the very framing of 
questions.” (1990, p98). What this analysis reveals is that there is something prior to the framing of 
questions: precisely deﬁning the phenomena we generate questions about! Contextual empiricism, 
and all other accounts of scientiﬁc objectivity Longino criticizes for that matter, fail to recognize this 
vital component of scientiﬁc practice.10 Not only does explication provide a framework for 
evaluating how researchers deﬁne the concepts they seek to study, but given the correlation 
established in the case of the female orgasm it might turn out that an emphasis on explication could 
potentially guard against the sociopolitical factors that can poison epistemic success. 
  
                                                 
9 Of course, having a quantitative concept is not suﬃcient for a ‘good’ theory e.g. I.Q testing, supply-side 
economics, astrology. 
10 Although, sometimes a precise deﬁnition of the phenomena is the aim of scientiﬁc inquiry. 
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